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I. INTRODUCTION: LABOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AS AN ISSUE OF ACADEMIC
STUDY AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY
The study of labor law enforcement in Latin America and the Caribbean
has become increasingly important among academic researchers1 not
insignificantly because many of the region’s countries have free trade
agreements (FTA) with the United States that incorporate a labor clause, or
“side agreement” in the case of the North America Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), calling for each party to enforce its national labor laws, broadly
defined to include both collective and individual rights.2 FTAs, except
NAFTA, include further commitments in favor of promoting internationally
1. See, e.g., Vera Jatobá, INT’L. LAB. OFFICE, NO. 148 INSPECCIÓN DEL TRABAJO EN EL
MARCO DE LA MODERNIZACIÓN DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN DEL TRABAJO: SERIE CONFERENCIA
INTERAMERICANA DE MINISTROS DEL TRABAJO 3, 6 (2002); Michael Piore & Andrew Schrank,
Toward a Managed Flexibility: The Revival of Labour Inspection in the Latin World, 147 INT’L
LAB. REV. 1, 23–25 (2008) [hereinafter Piore & Schrank]; Roberto Pires, Promoting Sustainable
Compliance: Styles of Labour Inspection and Compliance Outcomes in Brazil, 147 INT’L LAB.
REV. 199, 199–201 (2008); Andrew Schrank, Professionalization and Probity in the Patrimonial
State: Labor Inspectors in the Dominican Republic, 51 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y. 91, 91 (2009)
[hereinafter Schrank, Professionalism and Probity]; ANDREW SCHRANK & MICHAEL PIORE,
ECLAC/MEXICO, SERIE ESTUDIOS Y PERSPECTIVAS: NORMS, REGULATIONS AND LABOR
STANDARDS IN CENTRAL AMERICA at 43–47, U.N. DOC. 77, U.N. Sales No. E.07.II.G.44 (2007)
(calling for increased labor inspection) available at http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/3/
28113/Serie%2077.pdf.
2. MARY JANE BOLLE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, NAFTA LABOR SIDE AGREEMENT:
LESSONS FOR THE WORKER RIGHTS AND FAST-TRACK DEBATES (2002), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/8118.pdf.
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recognized core labor rights.3 The stress on national enforcement in all of
these FTAs, although criticized by some labor activists for being inadequate
and ineffective, has spurred modest but important institutional modernization
of some of the region’s labor law enforcement bodies with some improvements
in the enforcement of the labor laws.4
Chile is one of the countries with an FTA with the United States that
contains a labor clause calling for each party to respect core labor rights as
well as its national labor laws.5 The U.S.-Chile FTA establishes that when
matters arise regarding the parties’ commitment to enforcing their national
labor laws, the parties may request cooperative consultations to resolve the
matter.6 If such consultations do not resolve the dispute, then the parties may
resort to arbitration7 and sanctions.8
Today, Chile is effectively in violation of the labor clause of the U.S.-Chile
FTA for failing to enforce its 2006 Subcontracting Law (or “antisubcontracting law”).9 In 2008, the Chilean Supreme Court effectively
rendered unconstitutional Chile’s Dirección del Trabajo, or Labor Directorate’s
(hereinafter referred to by its Spanish acronym, “DT”) administrative
enforcement of the subcontracting law by holding that the DT acted as a socalled illegal “special commission” when it administratively adjudicated
matters related to “contractual controversies” arising from its enforcement of
the anti-subcontracting law.10 The DT is the sole administrative agency in
charge of enforcing all of the country’s labor laws. Thus, absent constitutional
reform in Chile enabling the DT to adjudicate contractual controversies
without being regarded as an illegal “special commission,” which seems highly
unlikely in the near future, or packing the courts with liberal judges,
enforcement of some labor laws, such as the anti-subcontracting law, will have
to be achieved through the courts rather than through administrative activity.11

3. U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, art. 18.1, (2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/chile/asset_upload_file535_3989.pdf [hereinafter U.S.Chile FTA].
4. See Schrank, Professionalism and Probity, supra note 1, at 91–92; Piore & Schrank,
supra note 1, at 1.
5. U.S.-Chile FTA, Art. 22.6.
6. Id. arts. 18.6, 22.4, 22.5; see also id., Annex 18.5.
7. Id. art. 22.6.
8. Id. art. 22.16.
9. Cód. Trab., Title VII (Chile) (codifying Chile Law No.20.123) (Sp.).
10. Supreme Court of Chile Rol. Nos. 877-2008, 953-2008, 1062-2008, 1063-2008, 10732008, 1074-2008, 1075-2008, 1076-2008, 1150-2008, May 12, 2008. The Codelco cases have
not been the only ones where the Supreme Court of Chile has determined that the DT acted as an
illegal “special commission.” See José Luis Ugarte Cataldo, Inspección del trabajo en Chile:
vicisitudes y desafíos, 6 REVISTA LATINO AMERICANA DE DERECHO SOCIAL 187, 188 (2008).
11. BUREAU OF INT’L. LAB. AFF., DEP’T OF LAB., NO. 2738, LABOR RIGHTS REPORT: CHILE
6 (2003), available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/usfta/hr2738chilelaborrights.pdf.
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Since no procedural avenues exist for workers to make group claims before the
courts—such as those that arise from most of the subcontracting cases—
judicial avenues for enforcing labor laws affecting group rights, such as the
anti-subcontracting law, are inadequate. This procedural inadequacy renders
the anti-subcontracting law effectively unenforceable and puts Chile in
violation of the U.S.-Chile FTA.
This paper first discusses the challenges that Chile faces in labor law
enforcement. Having higher-quality state institutions than most of its Latin
American and Caribbean cousins, Chile faces a different set of challenges
when it comes to labor law enforcement: its appellate courts’ and Supreme
Court’s zealous protections of their jurisdiction, private property rights, and
concomitant distrust of administrative activity and regulation, particularly in
the key area of subcontracting.12 The paper then details Chilean labor law,
explains how the country is not enforcing its important subcontracting statute,
and explains how the United States, through the U.S.-Chile FTA, can play a
useful role in promoting institutional reforms to effectively enforce labor laws
in Chile.
II. LABOR LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CHILE
Prior to the military coup of 1973, Chile was a country of strong unions
and active state intervention in social affairs.13
Pinochet’s military
dictatorship, installed through violence in 1973, banned unions, sharply
curtailed social rights, including the rights of labor, and promoted a laissez
faire, free-market political project which spurred neoliberalism in Latin
America.14 In 1979, the dictatorship relaxed some of its most radical measures
and lifted the ban on collective bargaining, but only at the enterprise level.15
Industrial level or multiemployer bargaining was not protected by law.16 Since
then, unions and sectors of the Chilean left have advocated for the
reestablishment of multiemployer bargaining. The center-left governments of
the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (“Concertación”) that ruled
the country from 1991–2010, however, did not amass the required internal
consensus or political capital—or perhaps political will—to do so.17
12. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 192.
13. RICHARD SANDBROOK ET AL., SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN THE GLOBAL PERIPHERY:
ORIGINS, CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS 149–50 (2007); BUREAU OF INT’L. LAB, supra note 11, at 1–
2.
14. SANDBROOK ET AL., supra note 13, at 159–60; BUREAU OF INT’L. LAB, supra note 11, at
1–2.
15. BUREAU OF INT’L. LAB. AFF., supra note 11, at 2.
16. Id.
17. Guillermo Campero, La Economía Política de las Relaciones Laborales 1990–2006, in
37 SERIE ESTUDIOS SOCIO ECONÓMICOS 28–30 (2007), available at http://www.cieplan.org/
inicio/codigo.php?documento=cieplan%2037.pdf; Volker Frank, Politics Without Policy, in
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Despite the lack of progress that labor unions and others on the left desired
after the restoration of democracy in Chile, particularly on the restoration of
multiemployer collective bargaining, the Concertación administrations clearly
reformed the labor laws.18 Among other reforms, they reestablished just cause
dismissal, adjusted minimum wages to inflation, placed new restrictions on
employer lockouts, and strengthened public institutions to better enforce the
labor laws.19
A.

The Labor Directorate

The Decreto con Fuerza de Ley No. 2 of 1967 (DFL No. 2), enacted during
the centrist, Christian Democratic Presidency of Eduardo Frei Montalva, is the
organic law of the DT. The law intends to provide an “agile and capable”
agency to “conveniently realize” the “technical and fiscal” tasks for labor
regulation in the country.20 It was enacted to provide for the “adequate
economic and social development of the country,” to “scrutinize the correct
application of the laws that guarantee the social rights of workers,” to
implement the labor laws, and to “aid the government in developing the
country’s social policy.”21 In this manner, the DT was created as an integrated,
labor law enforcement agency where one agency enforces all or most of the
country’s labor laws as is commonplace in Franco-Hispanic jurisdictions.22
As Professor José Luis Ugarte Cataldo has described, the DT has an array
of functions: policing, administrative interpretation of the law, conciliation and
VICTIMS OF THE CHILEAN MIRACLE: WORKERS AND NEOLIBERALISM IN THE PINOCHET ERA,
1973–2002, at 70 (Peter Winn ed.) (Duke 2004) (2006). However, note that there has never been
an overall attempt to revamp the entire Plan Laboral since the return of democracy in Chile.
Rather, reform has been attempted in a piecemeal fashion (I thank Professor José Luis Ugarte for
identifying this point).
18. See generally Campero, supra note 17, at 28–30. For a more critical view of postPinochet attempts to reform labor institutions, see generally Frank, supra note 17, at 70.
19. See generally Campero, supra note 17, at 16–23 (detailing the changes in Chilean labor
law in 1991 and the affects of those changes) (internal citations omitted).
20. DECRETO CON FUERZA DE LEY NO. 2, Preamble (Chile) [hereinafter DFL No.2].
21. Id.
22. Cód. Trab. art. 505 (Chile), available at http.//www.dt.gob.cl/legislacion/1611/articles59096_recurso_2.pdf. In France, Spain, and most of those European countries’ former colonies,
labor laws are enforced by one “generalist” government agency, rather than by an array of
“specialist” agencies, as in the United States. Moreover, rather than taking a principally punitive
orientation to enforcement, Franco-Hispanic systems attempt to “educate” employers about how
to implement labor laws and regulations through dissemination of best practices, labor laws, and
regulations, among other information, before imposing sanctions on employers. Therefore, in
contrast to the “specialist’ and “punitive” Anglo-American model of labor law inspection,
Franco-Hispanic labor law enforcement systems are characterized by their integrated or generalist
quality and pedagogic orientation to law enforcement. Michael J. Piore & Andrew Schrank,
Trading Up, BOSTON REV., Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 11, available at http://bostonreview.net/BR31.5/
pioreschrank.php.
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mediation, filing formal complaints in the courts, providing a public registry
(“registro”) of temporary employment agencies (“temp agencies”), and
attesting documents (“fe pública”).23 I would add a fledgling seventh function
to Professor Ugarte Cataldo’s categories of the DT: a “pedagogical” one
similar to that undertaken by other Franco-Hispanic labor law enforcement
bodies, which aims to educate employers on how to comply with the law. I
discuss these functions below, although not necessarily in the order listed
above.
1.

Policing

The policing function is performed by the country’s labor inspectors
employed by the DT, who can visit workplaces at any time, either de oficio—
without a preceding charge having been made by an employee against the
employer—or after receiving a charge.24 Inspectors can inspect the physical
premises and business records of employers at any time of the day or night.25
Persons who interfere with the inspectors’ duties can be fined.26 Employers
could be held directly and personally liable for such interferences, as well as
for any moral, physical, and material damages suffered by inspectors while
performing their duties.27 Inspectors can also summon public law enforcement
officials, including the carabineros, Chile’s respected national police, for
assistance.28
Once inspectors find that an employer committed a violation of a labor
law, they can fine the employer, order the suspension of work activities, and
even close a workplace if there is an immediate hazard to the life and health of
employees, or if employers are otherwise violating the labor laws.29
The focus on fines and other coercive measures makes labor inspection
particularly punitive in Chile, which is at odds with the more traditional
Franco-Hispanic systems of labor inspection that are generally pedagogically
oriented.30 As detailed below, the punitive orientation has been softened
somewhat with the introduction of some pedagogic inspections, which include
the substitution of fines for training and compliance assistance programs for
unionized employers. These programs, however, are still limited in scope.31

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Ugarte Catado supra note 10, at 193–96.
DFL No.2, art. 27.
Id. art. 25.
DFL No.2, art. 25.
Id. art. 25.
Id. art. 26.
Id. arts. 28, 31, 34, and 38.
See Piore & Shrank, Trading Up, supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.A.2.
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Pedagogical Inspections

Notwithstanding its primary punitive orientation, the DT has used more
than mere fines to compel employer compliance with the country’s labor laws.
Until the late 1990s, the DT issued “actas de instrucción” (writs of
instruction), whereby inspectors noted employer infractions and gave the
employer fifteen days to comply with the law before issuing a fine.32 These
writs of instruction had a quasi-pedagogical element to them, as employers
could avoid a fine by proving that they remedied the infraction and complied
with the law within that fifteen-day period.33
By the late 1990s, however, the DT discontinued writs of instruction and
installed more formalized programs including the compliance assistance
inspection policy34 and the “training-for-fines program.”35 The compliance
assistance program is limited to unionized employers, who are a small minority
of employers in Chile, and is administered by a small but highly professional
service within the national office of the DT.36 The training-for-fines program
provides that small employers with nine employees or fewer can request
assistance implementing the labor laws in lieu of fines levied by a labor
inspector.37
The training-for-fines program also provides medium-sized employers,
with twenty-five employees or fewer, an alternative to the fine. This
alternative is available only for violations of an occupational health and safety
rule if the employer requests the removal of a fine after issued by the DT.38
Rather than merely attending a course, mid-size employers, with ten to twentyfive employees must institute a program of voluntary compliance with the law
that they violated in lieu of the fine.39
The training-for-fines program has been regarded as a successful program
in Chile by authorities such as the ILO.40 It contains the elements of the

32. Interview with María Ester Feres, Director of Chile’s Labor Directorate from 1994–2004
(May 13, 2008) (on file with author); see also Heleen F.P. Ietswaart, Labor Relations Litigation:
Chile, 1970–1972, 16 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 625, 642–45 (1981–82) (describing a historical account
of the informal administrative practice).
33. Interview with María Ester Feres, supra note 32.
34. DIRECCIÓN DEL TRABAJO, 3 ORDEN DE SERVICO (May 14, 2004) (Chile), available at
http://www.dt.gob.cl/1601/articles-65345_OS_3.pdf.
35. CÓD. TRAB art. 506 (Chile), available at http://www.dt.gob.cl/legislacion/1611/articles59096_recurso_2.pdf [hereinafter CÓD. TRAB art. 506].
36. César F. Rosado Marzán, ethnographic fieldnotes of June 4, 2009 (on file with author).
37. CÓD. TRAB art. 506.
38. Id. art. 506.
39. Id.
40. Schrank & Piore, NORMS, REGULATIONS AND LABOUR STANDARDS IN CENTRAL
AMERICA, supra note 1, at 15 n.3.
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traditional assistance-for-compliance aspects of the Franco-Hispanic systems.41
The training-for-fines programs, however, remain limited only to smaller
employers.42
3.

Administrative Interpretation of the Law

The DFL No. 2 provides that the Director of the DT can determine the
meaning and scope of labor legislation in the country43 so that its career
servants can uniformly implement the law across the different regions of the
This type of administrative interpretation of the law is
country.44
accomplished in Chile through a procedure known as dictamen—an opinion or
report issued by the director of a specific administrative agency.45 A dictamen
directly binds all the officers of the administrative agency.46 It also indirectly
binds private parties regulated by the law, as they must adapt their behavior to
the dictamen if they want to reduce their chances of being fined or otherwise
penalized by the government agency.47
4.

Conciliation and Mediation

The DT, through its inspectors, also has the authority to summon parties
and documents to resolve disputes between individual employees and
employers.48 The inspectorate can fine any party that fails to appear without
just cause after being summoned.49 The DT has used these powers to resolve
alleged labor law violations before formally issuing sanctions50 or to settle
matters extra-judicially.51 As more fully explained below, conciliation at the
DT has recently become mandatory for some categories of wage and salary
cases.52

41. Id. at 10.
42. See CÓD. TRAB art. 506.
43. DFL NO.2, art. 1.
44. E-mail communication with Sergio Mejía Viedma, Partner, Arthur, Hinzpeter, Pizarro,
Huméres & Cía; Former Sub-Director, DT (1994–2000) (Mar. 5, 2008) (on file with author).
45. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 191. Other Chilean administrative agencies with
similar interpretative functions include the Controlaría General de la República (comptroller),
Servicios de Impuestos Internos (treasury), Servicio Nacional de Aduanas (customs), and
Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras (financial regulatory agency), among
others. Id. at 191 n.4.
46. Id. at 192.
47. Id. at 192 n.6 (internal citations omitted).
48. DFL NO.2 art. 29.
49. Id. art. 30.
50. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 194.
51. See Antonio de la Jara, BPH Wants Chile Mediation on Spence Strike, REUTERS, Oct. 1,
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idusn0141049420091001.
52. Infra Part III.A. Note, the practice historically has been that most employees conciliate
their charge against employers at the DT because the DT is seen as more responsive to workers
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Finally, as with French labor inspectors, the Chilean labor inspectorate at
the DT can also mediate collective bargaining disputes.53 If a union declares a
strike, the union or the employer can request that the DT mediate the conflict.54
The strike is suspended until the mediation process is exhausted.55
5.

Filing Complaints

Notwithstanding its authority to generally administer and enforce all labor
laws in Chile, the DT does not have authority to adjudicate all matters, and
sometimes must file a complaint in the labor courts when it determines a
violation of the law has occurred. These violations include “anti-union” and
disloyal practices by unions,56 and violations of “fundamental rights.”57 Antiunion activities and disloyal practices in Chile resemble what in the United
States we call “unfair labor practices.” These practices include discrimination
against employees who belong to a union, not providing information required
for collective bargaining, and interfering in the internal matters of the union,
among other actions.58 Employees may also commit similar illegal acts called
“disloyal” actions against employers, which the DT should also refer to the
courts.59 “Fundamental rights” include the right to life and physical integrity,
the right to private communications, the right to honor, conscience and
religion, free speech, freedom to enter into employment contracts, and freedom
from sexual harassment.60
6.

Registry of Temporary Employment Agencies

Under the new anti-subcontracting law, which is further detailed below,
agents that provide temporary employees to principals that will be under the
control of the principal—“empresas de servicios transitorios” or “enterprises

claims than the more conservative courts of justice. See Ietswaart, supra note 32, at 642–46, 648.
After a recent labor justice reform, most wage claims will now be first conciliated at the DT
before being heard by the labor judge in response to this known fact that conciliations tend to be
very effective in resolving wage cases. Infra Part III.A.
53. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 194. For the role of French labor inspectors in
mediating labor disputes see generally Donald Reid, Putting Social Reform into Practice: Labor
Inspectors in France, 1892–1914, 20 J. OF SOC. HIST. 67 (1986); Donald Reid, ‘Les Jeunes
Inspecteurs’: Ideology and Activism Among Labour Inspectors in France After May 1968, 8
FRENCH HIST. 296 (1994).
54. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 194.
55. Id.
56. CÓD. TRAB art. 292.
57. Id. art. 485–86; see also Ugarte Cataldo supra note 10, at 194–95.
58. Id. art. 289.
59. CÓD. TRAB, art. 290.
60. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 194–95; CÓD. TRAB. art. 485; CONST. CHILE, art. 19.
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of temporary services” (“temp agencies”)—must register with the DT.61 If the
DT cancels their registration that temp agency becomes, for all practical
effects, “extinct” and cannot transact business.62
7.

Attesting Documents

Finally, the DT, through its inspectors, also acts as a ministro de fe, or a
sort of official witness.63 As ministros de fe, factual determinations contained
in the labor inspectors’ official documents can be used as evidence in court,
and their contents are presumed to be true unless proven otherwise.64 This
function is especially useful in those cases where the courts serve as the
ultimate adjudicator of a complaint under the labor law.
8.

Labor Inspections After Pinochet

The Chilean government has done an outstanding job reviving the DT after
Pinochet’s rule left the institution in tatters.65 As Table 1 shows, the number of
labor inspections increased from 26,868 to 53,973 during 1993, more than
doubling three years after democracy was restored.66 Today labor inspections
total more than 100,000 inspections per year. As Table 2 shows, while in
1990, only about 8% of all inspections were performed de oficio—or
unsolicited—the number increased dramatically in 1992 to 23%.67 De oficio
inspections peaked in 1996, amounting to more than 50% of all inspections.68
Since then, the percent of all inspections that have been performed de oficio
has oscillated between 51% and 32%, with the exception of 2002, when only
13% of all inspections were made de oficio.69

61. El Funcionamiento de las Empresas de Servicios Transorios de Servicios y el Contrato
de Trabajo de Servicios Transitorios, Law No.20.123, in BOLETIN OFICIAL DE LA DIRECCION
DEL TRABAJO (November 2006); Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 195.
62. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 195.
63. DFL NO.2, art. 23.
64. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 196.
65. BUREAU OF INT’L. LAB. AFF., supra note 11, at 1–2.
66. Dirección del Trabajo, SERIES ESTADÍSTICAS 1990–2008, CAP. IV. ACTIVIDAD
INSPECTIVA 4, available at http://www.dt.gob.cl/documentacion/1612/w3-article-95234.html.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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Table 1: Number of Labor Inspections, 1990–2008
Year

No. of
Inspections

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

26,868
30,936
41,218
53,973
54,359
65,090
76,084
76,943
79,327
87,545
95,255
101,259
74,255
97,947
94,981
114,937
131,891
139,108
118,434

Source: Adapted from Dirección del Trabajo, Series Estadícas
Cap. IV Actividad Inspectiva

Table 2: De Oficio Inspections 1990–2008

Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

No. of
De Oficio
Inspections
2179
2353
9378
19,729
22,044
30,779
39,217
39,024
38,044
42,601
39,225
34,302
9647
36,348
33,627
37,276
53,543
59,800
37,593

As a %
of all
Inspections
8%
8%
23%
37%
41%
47%
52%
51%
48%
49%
41%
34%
13%
37%
35%
32%
41%
43%
32%

Source: Adapted from Dirección del Trabajo, Series Estadícas Cap.
IV Actividad Inspectiva
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21

Inspectors / 100,000 employed persons

Chile

18
15
12
9
Guat.
Pan.

6
Uru.

3

Dom.
Rep.

Costa
Rica
Hond.

Arg.
Braz.
Para.

Mex.

Peru

El Sal.
Nicar.

0

Ecuador
Colom.

Source: Adapted from ANDREW SCHRANK AND MICHAEL PIORE, ECLAC/MEXICO, SERIE
ESTUDIOS Y PERSPECTIVAS NO. 77, NORMS, REGULATIONS AND LABOR STANDARDS IN
CENTRAL AMERICA 22 (2007). Years vary (Argentina 1999; Brazil 2005; Chile 2005;
Dominican Republic 2005; Ecuador 2006; Guatemala 2004; Honduras 2005; Mexico 2002;
Nicaragua 2005; Panama 2006, Paraguay 2005; Peru 2003; Uruguay 2006).

In 1999, Chile signed ILO Convention No. 87 (on freedom of association,
protecting the right to organize) and Convention No. 98 (on the right to
organize and bargain collectively).70 After a period of military dictatorship
and repression of labor leaders, activists, and ordinary workers, the ratification
of the ILO conventions signaled Chile’s commitment to respect workers’ right
to organize.71 In 2000, Chile also ratified ILO Convention No. 182 concerning
child labor.72 At about that time, Chile also doubled the size of its labor
inspectorate73 to attain the largest labor inspector per citizen in Latin
America.74 The country now boasts about nineteen inspectors per every
100,000 employed persons,75 a figure significantly higher than the rest of the

70. BUREAU OF INT’L. LAB. AFF., supra note 11, at 6.
71. Id. at 1, 3.
72. Id. at 3.
73. Piore & Schrank, supra note 1, at 3.
74. According to María Ester Feres, the Director of the DT from 1994 to 2004, she left the
DT with more than 2000 functionaries, a huge improvement over the tattered, eighty-person body
that remained when Pinochet gave up the reins of power in 1990. Interview with María Ester
Feres, supra note 32.
75. See Piore & Schrank, supra note 2, at 22. Although the Chilean DT and other labor
inspection experts claim the Chilean DT is among the most active in Latin America, through my

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

OF LABOR INSPECTORS AND JUDGES

509

region. As Figure 1 shows, the country with the highest per capita number of
inspectors after Chile is Guatemala, with 7.53 inspectors per every 100,000
workers, followed by Uruguay with 5.79 inspectors per every 100,000 workers
and Panama with 5.6 inspectors per every 100,000 workers.76
Finally, we should note that Chile increased its commitment to enforce
core labor rights and its own labor laws when it signed the U.S-Chile FTA,
which took effect on January 1, 2004.77 Since the early 1990s, when NAFTA
was negotiated between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, the United
States has been negotiating FTAs with labor clauses, a “side agreement” under
NAFTA where each party promises to enforce its own labor laws so as to not
use non-enforcement as an instrument of unfair trade.78 The United States and
its trade partners attempt to enforce the parties’ obligations under the FTA’s
labor clauses through bilateral “consultations.”79 There is no enforcement
mechanism under the current FTAs to enforce core labor rights.80
Consultations are geared to find solutions to any disputes regarding possible
violations of the labor clauses, and, if such consultations fail, parties can seek
mediation, arbitration, and/or request monetary sanctions against the adverse
party.81
B.

The Labor Courts

Courts in Chile have exclusive jurisdiction over several categories of
labor-law-related claims, including nonpayment of wages and other
remunerations, unfair dismissal cases and unfair labor practices.82 Jurisdiction
of ordinary labor law complaints is exercised in Chile in the first instance by

fieldwork in Chile’s DT it has come to my attention that the 19/100,000 labor inspector figure
may be inflated due to the fact that the DT considers most of its rank-and-file officers
“fiscalizadores,” or labor inspectors, even if these are mostly doing clerical work at one of the DT
offices.
76. See Piore & Schrank, supra note 1, at 22.
77. DIRECCIÓN DEL TRABAJO-DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS, 32 CUADERNOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN:
LOS DERECHOS LABORALES DEL TRATADO DE LIBRE COMERCIO CHILE-ESTADO UNIDOS EN LA
INDUSTRIA FORESTAL Y EN LA INDUSTRIA DEL SALMÓN 9 (2007).
78. See BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAW AND GLOBAL TRADE 107–09 (2005).
79. U.S.-Chile FTA, art. 22.4.
80. See generally, U.S.-Chile FTA.
81. U.S.-Chile FTA, arts. 18.5, 18.6, 22.4, 22.5, 22.6, 22.16, and Annex 18.5. Note, under
NAFTA/NAALC, private parties can also file “submissions”—a kind of complaint—in a
National Administrative Office (“NAO”) of labor law violations of the NAALC against the U.S.,
Canada, or Mexico. There are three NAOs, one in each NAFTA/NAALC signatory country. A
party must file a submission in a NAO that is not located in the country being complained of in
the submission. If the NAO accepts the submission, and finds a violation, it may recommend
consultations between the signing members of NAFTA/NAALC to resolve the alleged violations.
HEPPLE supra note 78, at 110.
82. CÓD. TRAB., art. 420.
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the labor courts.83 Labor court decisions can be appealed in the court of
appeals and thereafter in the Supreme Court.84
Labor courts can also review the actions of the DT through ordinary appeal
procedures.85 In addition, courts of appeals may review the DT’s action
through a special injunctive procedure called “recurso de protección,” or
protection procedure.86 Protection procedures are available only to those
plaintiffs who allege a violation of their constitutional rights under Article 19
of Chile’s political constitution.87 Hence, while labor inspectors have the
authority to assess violations of most labor laws and impose sanctions or other
penalties on employers, courts retain exclusive jurisdiction over some matters
and have authority to review the actions of the DT.
1.

Wage Claims

Under Chilean labor law, the DT may compel parties to attend a
conciliation hearing regarding wage claims, although it cannot officially
adjudicate the claims.88 Conciliation has generally not been a jurisdictional
requirement for wage claims, but the labor laws have recently been amended to
create a new procedure called the “proceso monitorio,” or monitoring
procedure, where wage claims regarding the nonpayment of wages totaling ten
monthly minimum wage salaries or less must first be conciliated by the DT.89
The worker–plaintiff files a complaint with the DT, which will summon both
the employer and the worker in an attempt to conciliate the matter.90 The
parties must take all relevant evidence to that hearing.91 If the matter is not
settled at conciliation, the DT produces a report that the worker–plaintiff can
then file in the labor court with his or her complaint, along with the rest of the
documentary evidence presented at the DT.92 Once filed in court, the judge

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. arts. 420, 474.
Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 193–94.
CÓD. TRAB., art. 420(e).
CONST., art. 20 (Chile).
CÓD. TRAB., art. 420(e).
Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 193–94.
CÓD. TRAB, art. 496–97. See also RODOLFO WALTER DÍAZ & GABRIELA LANATA
FUENZALIDA, REGIMEN LEGAL DEL NUEVO PROCESO LABORAL CHILENO 285–95 (2009). In
2005, the minimum monthly salary in Chile was 120,000 Chilean pesos a month, or roughly
about U.S. $221, Oanda.com, http://www.onada.com/convert/fxhistory (last visited Oct. 8, 2009)
(using the exchange rate of January, 1, 2005). Ten minimum wage monthly salaries, therefore,
would amount to about US $2210. For minimum wage rates in Chile in 2005 see Dirección del
Trabajo, PROYECTO DEBERÁ SER DESPACHADO EN 2 DÍAS POR EL SENADO, SALARIO MÍNIMO
AUMENTARÁ EN 3.8%, available at http://www.dt.gob.cl/1601/article-63791.html.
90. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 192.
91. CÓD. TRAB., art. 497.
92. Id. art. 497.
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must accept or deny the worker’s complaint based on the merits of the case.93
Thereafter, any of the parties has ten days to oppose the court’s decision.94 If
there is no filed opposition to the judge’s resolution within the ten-day period,
then res judicata prevents the action from being appealed. If any of the parties
files a timely opposition, then the judge must schedule a hearing within fifteen
days of the opposition and thereafter issue a decision.95 The court’s decision
can be appealed through ordinary appeals procedures available for labor
matters, except through the procedure of “unificación de jurisprudencia,” or
unification of jurisprudence, established by article 483 et seq. of the Chilean
Labor Code.96
2.

Unfair Labor Practices and Violation of Fundamental Rights

Labor courts also retain exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practices in
Chile.97 Labor inspectors cannot adjudicate unfair labor practices, but they can
investigate these charges and thereafter file a complaint in the courts if their
investigation sustains an infraction of law.98 Sanctions in these cases include
fines99 and “shaming naming,” as the DT must keep a record of employers who
commit unfair labor practices and publicize it.100 Currently, this list is
publicized on the DT’s website.101
The labor courts also have a “tutelary” procedure where individual
employees and labor unions can seek protection of “fundamental rights”102 that
are violated at work.103 Fundamental rights include the right to life and
physical integrity,104 privacy,105 conscience and religion,106 free speech,107 and

93. Id. art. 499.
94. Id. art. 500.
95. Id. art. 500–01.
96. CÓD. TRAB, art. 502. Unification of jurisprudence joins several cases concerning the
same legal question or questions, but were decided disparately by the lower courts, so that they
can be heard and decided collectively by one court of appeals and provide consistency to the
jurisprudence. Id. art. 483.
97. CÓD. TRAB, art. 420(e).
98. Id. art. 292.
99. Id. art. 389.
100. Id. art. 390.
101. GOBIERNO DE CHILE DIRECCIÓN DEL TRABAJO, EMPRESAS Y/O EMPLEADORES (AS)
available at
CONDENADOS POR PRÁCTICAS ANTISINDICALES SEGUNDO SEMESTRE 2007,
http://www.dt.gob.cl/1601/articles-95482_recurso_1.pdf.
102. CÓD. TRAB, Title VII.
103. Due to space limitations I have very briefly sketched the tutelary procedure, but for a
much more in depth description see WALTER DÍAZ & LENATA FUENZALIDA, supra note 89, § 10.
104. See CONST. CHILE, art. 19(1).
105. See id. arts. 4–5.
106. See id. art. 6.
107. Id. art. 7.
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freedom to make employment contracts.108 The courts’ tutelary proceeding
can also be used to bring sexual harassment complaints.109 Courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over those complaints. Labor inspectors must file a
complaint in the court if, as result of their investigation, they take notice of an
infraction of fundamental rights.110 The DT may also become a party in the
suit.111 Before filing a complaint in the court, however, the Inspections
Division of the DT must attempt to mediate the controversy.112 Finally, the
labor union of the aggrieved worker named in the suit can also join as an
aggrieved party, either a “tercero coayudante,” third co-helper, or as a primary
party if it originally filed the complaint in court.113
3.

Labor Justice Reforms

Labor courts have been in existence in Chile since 1924, with an original
role to “compensate for economic inferiority with legal superiority.”114
However, they were not considered to be effective guardians of workers’ rights
by some commentators and analysts of the court system.115 Perhaps as a result
of those criticisms the government of Chile reformed its labor courts. In 2005
the country enacted a “Labor Justice” reform, which promises rapid, oral, and
adversarial trials for labor controversies, in contrast to the allegedly slow and
written proceedings of the past. It increased the number of labor courts from
twenty to eighty-four.116 It also seeks to hire almost 500 new functionaries to
assist the new judges, as well as 137 legal aid lawyers that will represent
plaintiffs free of charge.117 These new resources and procedures for bringing
labor law complaints before the courts are intended to speed up labor law
decisions, from about three years to ninety days.118
II. THE UNENFORCEABLE ANTI-SUBCONTRATING LAW
An important and recent labor law development in Chile has been the antisubcontracting law, which limits employers’ use of subcontracting.119 Even
though Chilean lawmakers gave the DT authority to enforce the new anti-

108. Id. art. 16.
109. CÓD. TRAB, art. 485.
110. Id. art. 486.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Ietswaart, supra note 32, at 656.
115. Id. at 656–58.
116. Dirección del Trabajo, Judicatura especializada comenzó a regir en regiones de
Atacama y Magallanes, available at http://www.dt.gob.cl/1601/printer-95490.html.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. CÓD. TRAB Title VII.
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subcontracting law, the Chilean appellate-level courts and its Supreme Court
have determined that any adjudication of contractual matters performed by the
DT, even under the new law, would violate the constitutional right to not be
judged by so-called “special commissions” because adjudications of
contractual controversies reside exclusively within the province of the
courts.120 These decisions by the Supreme Court of Chile have led the DT to
clash with the courts, rendering Chile’s labor law enforcement system, at least
in the eyes of one prominent commentator, “difficult.”121
A.

The Anti-Subcontracting Law

Labor activists and advocates maintain that subcontracting is currently
abused by employers. Since Chilean labor law only protects single-employer
collective bargaining, subcontracting has become a major tool for employers to
evade collective bargaining and to be able to hire and fire workers more
easily.122 Subcontracting blemished the social record of the center-left Chilean
governments of 1991–2010 that championed the causes of workers as the
sharpest increases in subcontracting occurred during its tenure. The mining
industry, which is mostly state-owned, was one of the industries that expanded
the use of subcontracting during the years of the Concertación.123 In 1990,
only about 13% of employees in the mining industry were subcontracted, but
by 2004 the figure reached 61%.124 In some regions of the country,
subcontracting has become the employment norm. For example, in the
Copaipó agricultural valley, researchers recently estimated that about 95% of
all employed persons were employed as subcontracted employees.125
Moreover, the general rate of growth in subcontracting has been significant. In
1999, about 32.7% of all Chilean workers employed by general industry were
subcontracted, and just five years later the figure increased to 43.3%.126
120. Supreme Court of Chile, Rol. Nos. 877-2008, 953-2008, 1062-2008, 1063-2008, 10732008, 1074-2008, 1075-2008, 1076-2008, 1150-2008, May 12, 2008. After consulting with
various members of the Chilean bar, there seems to be no clear definition of what a “special
commission” is in Chilean jurisprudence. Rather, “special commissions” have been declared by
courts ex post, without defining them, and merely seem to mean a body that is not officially a
court of justice.
121. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 187.
122. DIRECCIÓN DEL TRABAJO Y DEPARTMENTO DE ESTUDIOS El Otro Trabajo: El
Suministro De Personas En Las Empresas, NO. 7 CUADERNO DE INVESTIGACIÓN 44 (2001);
Rodrigo Figueroa Valenzuela, Regulación de la subcontratación y el suministro de trabajadores
en Chile, 16 VEREDAS 129 (2008) (MEXICO). Dirección del Trabajo, División de Estudios, Los
Riesgos Laborales de la Subcontratación, 19 APORTE AL DEBATE LABORAL 47 (2006).
123. Dirección del Trabajo, División de Estudios, Los Riesgos Laborales de la
Subcontratación, 19 APORTE AL DEBATE LABORAL 47 (2006).
124. Id.
125. Figueroa Valenzuela, supra note 122, at 132.
126. Dirección del Trabajo, supra note 123, at 52.
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Subcontracted employees generally suffer worse conditions and terms of
employment than regular employees.127 Given that only single-employer
collective bargaining is protected by Chilean law, subcontracted workers
cannot bargain with the principal. Subcontracting constrains unionization and
has become one of the main targets of labor activists and organizations.128
Labor organizations have every reason to be concerned about their current
condition and future in Chile. General labor union density in 2007 stood at a
mere 11%.129 Having been at 12.4% in 1991,130 union density has diminished
under the Concertación administrations.131
To limit subcontracting, the Chilean government approved an antisubcontracting law in 2006.132 In addition to forcing temp agencies to register
with the DT, the law only permits employer–principals to hire workers that are
going to be under the principal’s control only for specific and “irregular”
reasons: to substitute a regular employee that is taking a leave of absence; for
“extraordinary events,” such as organizing a conference; for “new and specific
projects” including the construction of new facilities or the expansion of
existing ones; to fill vacancies during the opening days of new enterprises; or
If employers subcontract employees under the
for “urgent” tasks.133
principal’s control for other purposes, the law will consider the subcontracted
workers to be regular employees of the principal and the employees will obtain
all the rights of regular employees.134 Finally, the law provides the DT with
the authority to enforce the new law.135 The statute reads:
The Labor Directorate will enforce compliance with the norms of [the law in
the] place or places where such services are rendered and in the enterprise
136
providing temporary services . . . .

127. In the mining industry, for example, the DT has discovered that the average hours
worked by miners, which are generally excessive—or 2300 hours worked a year—is much higher
for subcontracted miners, who generally work 2600 hours in one year. Dirección del Trabajo,
supra note 123, at 51. Also, subcontracting hinders unionization and collective bargaining
because Chilean law does not protect workers’ right to engage in multiemployer collective
bargaining. Figueroa Valenzuela, supra note 122, at 133 n.8. Subcontracting is thus a strategy
for union busting.
128. Figueroa Valenzuela supra note 122, at 132–33.
129. División de Estudios: Dirección del Trabajo SERIES ESTADÍSTICAS, Cuadro 1: Cantidad
de huelgas legales efectuades trabajadores, involucrados, días de duración y costo días-persona,
a nivel nacional, años 1990 a 2008, at 4 (1990–2008).
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. CÓD. TRAB, art.183(A–AE).
133. Id. art. 183(Ñ).
134. Id. art. 183(U).
135. Id. art. 183(G).
136. Id. (translation by author).
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The Codelco Decisions

Notwithstanding the new policy against subcontracting abuse, the stateowned mining company Codelco, nationalized by Salvador Allende in 1971 to
develop national capital and redistribute the country’s wealth among the
popular classes, challenged the DT when it imposed fines on Codelco for
violating the anti-subcontracting law. The DT determined that Codelco had
illegally subcontracted about 5000 employees under the anti-subcontracting
law.137 Codelco claimed, however, and the Supreme Court later affirmed, that
the DT violated the constitutional rights of the state mining company and its
subcontractors because the DT did not have the authority to adjudicate
contractual disputes related to the subcontracting arrangements.138 The
Supreme Court decided that the DT violated the constitutional rights of
employers, including the right of persons to be judged by a court rather than
“special commissions,”139 the right to freely make labor contracts,140 the right
to engage in legal economic activities,141 and the right to private property.142
Moreover, the court determined that the DT had exceeded its jurisdiction by
adjudicating (“calificar”) contractual matters. Finally, the Supreme Court
deemed the actions of the DT arbitrary and illegal because the DT did not
allow the subcontractors to participate in the proceedings which led to its
determination that Codelco had to absorb the 5000 employees.143
In a concurring opinion, one justice agreed with the majority’s result,
reasoning that Codelco had appropriately hired the employees under the antisubcontracting law.144 However, the concurring opinion distanced itself from
the majority by arguing that the DT had the authority to decide whether or not
an employer was violating the anti-subcontracting law. According to the
concurring justice, the DT performed an otherwise legitimate “administrative
act” when it attempted to determine if Codelco violated the anti-subcontracting
law; therefore, the DT’s decision did not amount to an unconstitutional act of a
“special commission.”145 According to the Judge:
The administrative authority is sanctioned to legally describe the facts, being
this part of the administrative activity. Indeed, it is precisely this juridical
adjudication [calificación jurídica] the one that is indispensable for the

137. Supreme Court of Chile, Rol No. 887-2008, May 12, 2008.
138. Id.
139. See CONST., art. 19 §, 3.
140. See id. art. 19, § 16.
141. See id. art. 19, § 21.
142. See id. art. 19, § 24.
143. Supreme Court of Chile Rol. No. 887-2008, May 12, 2008.
144. A panel of three career justices and one “abogado integrante”—a practicing attorney that
Chilean law gives authority to participate in the Supreme Court decisions—decided the cases.
145. Supreme Court of Chile Rol. No. 887-2008, May 12, 2008, concurring opinion of Judge
Pierry.
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exercise of that activity, in particular for the administrative sanction, reason
why the Labor Inspectorate has not violated article 19 No. 3 . . . of the
Political Constitution of the Republic by acting as a special commission,
146
rather, it has done so in the performance of an administrative activity.

Additionally, the concurring opinion stated that the DT was especially justified
in adjudicating the matter given its lack of standing to take subcontracting
cases to the courts.147 The concurring judge said that because the Supreme
Court took away the DT’s authority to adjudicate matters through the
administrative process, the Supreme Court was effectively making it
impossible to enforce the anti-subcontracting law except through the
complaints of individual workers, a remedy he considered “illusory.”148 The
judge likely found that enforcing the anti-subcontracting law through
individual complaints would be “illusory” due to classic collective action
problems associated with large groups of plaintiffs who have individual claims
worth relatively little compared to the cost of the suit. Also, workers would
possibly fear losing their jobs by bringing their claims to the courts as
individuals.
After the Codelco decisions were made public, the DT requested that the
Chilean Congress enact laws providing the DT with standing to represent
aggrieved workers under the anti-subcontracting law.149 Although some
lawmakers discussed the matter and agreed to pursue it, to date, the DT has not
received these powers. The matter was left to die a slow and almost
anonymous death.150 The rest of the paper now discusses the policy options to

146. The Spanish-language original citation reads:
La autoridad administrativa está facultada para calificar jurídicamente los hechos, siendo
esto parte de la actividad administrativa. En efecto, es precisamente dicha calificación
jurídica la que es indispensable para el ejercicio de esa actividad, en particular para la
sanción administrativa, por lo que al hacerlo la Inspección del Trabajo no ha vulnerado lo
dispuesto en el artículo 19 N° 3 inciso 4° de la Constitución Política de la República
actuando como comisión especial, sino que lo ha hecho en el desempeño de una actividad
administrativa.
Supreme Court of Chile, Rol No. 887-2008 (emphasis added in English translation).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. G. Orellana et al., Justicia da duro golpe a la Dirección del Trabajo y revierte
dictámenes contra Codelco, EL MERCURIO, May 13, 2008 at B2. A. Chaparro & C. Palma;
Directora del Trabajo: “Hubo Cierta Disparidad de Criterio’s,” LA NACIÓN, May 13, 2008, at
10, available at http://www.lanacion.cl/prontus_noticias_v2/site/artic/20080512/pags/200805122
05003.html; H. Cisternas, P. Obregón y L. Castañeda, MINISTROS PÉREZ YOMA Y ANDRADE
REBATEN A CUEVAS Y DICEN QUE CODELCO CUMPLE ACUERDOS, EL MERCURIO, May 14, 2008,
at B2; H. Cisternas, P. Obregón y L. Castañeda, La Corte Suprema Dictaría Precedente:
Expertos: fallo apunta a excesos históricos del ente fiscalizador, EL MERCURIO, May 14, 2008, at
B2.
150. César F. Rosado Marzán, fieldnotes of December 18, 2009 (on file with author).
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enforce the anti-subcontracting law after these events and legal decisions,
including the DT’s request to obtain standing to file complaints in the labor
courts under the anti-subcontracting law.
IV. SOME POLICY CHOICES
Chile confronts not only internal difficulties in enforcing its domestic labor
laws, particularly its anti-subcontracting law, but also cannot meet its
commitments under the labor clause of the U.S.-Chile FTA. Reforms are
required. To help, labor and human rights activists could pressure the United
States government to start a process of consultations under the U.S.-Chile FTA
to seek enforcement of the anti-subcontracting law. The United States could
resolve this stalemate by pursuing a two-pronged approach to make the antisubcontracting law enforceable: (1) Extend the scope of pedagogical labor
inspections in Chile, and (2) provide standing to the DT, as its Director
requested after the Codelco decisions in 2008, so that it can file complaints in
the labor courts under the anti-subcontracting law.
A.

Extending Pedagogical Inspections

Perhaps the one policy option which would likely face less opposition from
Chilean employers and the right-wing is the expansion of the DT’s pedagogical
inspections. Pedagogical inspections stress compliance assistance rather than
punitive fines and strive to obtain voluntary compliance with labor laws
Scholars have maintained that
through eventual “self-regulation.”151
pedagogical inspections historically aided some countries in implementing
their labor laws in a manner that promotes organizational innovation at the
workplace while safeguarding comparative advantage and social stability.152
Chile should not shy away from extending these programs.
Already, Chile has instituted at least two programs with pedagogical
elements.153 One, the “training-for-fines” program, has been heralded as a
success by many sectors because it provides smaller employers with some
needed wherewithal to comply with the labor laws.154 Extending the program
to larger employers, such as Codelco, could better facilitate understanding of
151. For a general overview of the “self-regulation” literature, termed to be part of the “new
governance” school of legal thought see Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and
the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2005);
Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 319, 319 (2005).
152. See generally Piore & Schrank, supra note 1, art. 1; Donald Reid, Putting Social Reform
into Practice: Labor Inspectors in France, 1892–1914, 20 J. OF SOC. HIST. 67, 76–78 (1986);
Donald Reid, ‘Les Jeunes Inspecteurs’: Ideology and Activism Among Labour Inspectors in
France After May 1968, 8 FRENCH HIST. 296, 297–98 (1994).
153. See supra notes 30–31.
154. Piore & Schrank, supra note 1, at 15.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

518

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:497

the labor laws among managers and facilitate ways to implement the law
efficiently.
Another program with pedagogical elements is the compliance-assistance
inspections policy, which is implemented mainly at organized workplaces
where labor unions can serve as a monitoring body.155 But since most
employers have no unionized employees, compliance assistance remains a very
limited inspection policy in Chile.156
To increase the scope and breadth of pedagogical inspections, Chilean
labor inspectors need to think of themselves as more than a mere police force
and act, at least at times, as human resource consultants and innovators of
production processes. This is particularly important to implement in Chile
since its compliance orientation is primarily punitive, leading to conflicts with
employers, which result in litigation where the DT is ultimately reprimanded
and its authority formally limited. Here, Chile’s enforcement orientation
policy contrasts with that of its much poorer cousin, the Dominican Republic,
which, even though it generally lacks quality state institutions, has recently
overhauled its inspection service to persuade employers that labor law
compliance is not only a legal requirement, but also good for business, in the
mold of the traditional French model.157 As sociologist Andrew Schrank
asserts for the Dominican Republic:
While scofflaw employers frequently assert an inability to comply with the law
and remain profitable, professional inspectors respond—at least occasionally—
by pointing to their compliant neighbors and their organizational differences:
What differentiates the compliant firms from their non-compliant neighbors?
They train their managers. They use modular production . . . . They pursue
vertical integration. And they sometimes diversify . . . into more remunerative
activities. By distributing information on training and best practices . . . the
inspectors overcome an important market imperfection and thereby make
158
compliance good for business.

Professional labor inspectors should provide a service to employers that
helps them innovate and establish best practices. In the United States, firms
purchase such advice from human resource management professionals.159 In
Franco-Hispanic jurisdictions, labor inspectors serve a similar role when they
are properly trained and provided with the appropriate resources.160 Such a
service, provided as a public good to employers, can prove invaluable for the

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

César F. Rosado Marzán, ethnographic fieldnotes of June 4, 2009.
See id.
See supra note 126.
Schrank supra note 1, at 16–17.
See supra note 130.
Schrank, supra note 1, at 16; see Piore & Schrank, supra note 1, at 1, 10–11.
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Chilean economy. It could also prove crucial for the enforcement of Chilean
labor law.
Pedagogical inspections require a highly professionalized labor
inspectorate, which may be difficult to create in cash-strapped developing
economies. But Chile could at least promote further professionalization of its
existing inspectorate by providing its new inspection school (which opened in
2009) with resources to develop inspection professionals that view themselves
as more than a labor police.161 Targeted courses and specific resources aimed
at teaching inspectors about developing best practices from their field
inspections and then disseminating those best practices to other workplaces
could go a long way towards creating a different compliance culture in Chile.
The United States also could play a useful role in the professionalization of
the labor inspectorate of Chile through cooperative consultations under the
FTA. While it has been argued that the United States has followed a more
“punitive” model of labor law enforcement common to Anglo-American
jurisdictions,162 with little resemblance to the Franco-Hispanic model, this does
not mean that the United States lacks professionals experienced in instructing
employers on compliance with labor laws and cementing cultures of labor law
compliance. Because the United States federal government has been
“administratively weak,” it has depended on civil society, namely human
resource management professionals, to instruct employers on how to comply
with the country’s labor laws and protect themselves against expensive
lawsuits.163 United States labor and employment attorneys representing
management have developed sophisticated practices to “bullet proof”
employers from liability arising from labor and employment law violations and
have disseminated these prophylactic practices to other countries.164 While
cooperative consultations between Chile and the United States must be
sensitive to particular types of labor law violations, industries, employer types,
institutional contexts, and substantive legal differences between both countries,

161. In my recent fieldwork, I discovered that while the DFL No.2 stated in 1967 that an
inspection school had to be created, no school was developed at all until 2009—forty-two years
after the statute was enacted—and the current school still remains embryonic, has no physical
premises, and requires substantial work before it is an institution that, in truth, forms labor
inspectors.
162. See Piore & Schrank, supra note 1, at 13.
163. For details on how human resource professionals help enforce United States labor laws
see Frank Dobbin & John R. Sutton, The Strength of a Weak State: The Rights Revolution and the
Rise of Human Resources Management Divisions, 104 AM. J. SOC. 441, 470–72 (1998). For
details on the role of the management-side labor law bar in creating prophylactic methods for
employers to evade labor and employment law claims, see Susan Bisom-Rapp, Exceeding Our
Boundaries: Transnational Employment Law Practice and Export of American Lawyering Styles
to the Global Worksite, 25 COMP. LAB. & POL’Y J. 257, 264 (2004).
164. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 163, at 266–67.
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there can be fruitful exchanges between Chilean labor law enforcement
agents—namely, the labor inspectorate—and American professionals who
specialize in instructing employers regarding means to compliance with labor
and employment laws. Experimenting with these consultations may prove to
be an innovative strategy for cross-border labor diplomacy under the U.S.Chile FTA.165
B.

Granting Standing to the DT

In addition to the promise of self-regulatory strategies oriented by
pedagogical inspection programs, Chile also realistically needs to threaten
violators of labor laws with punitive sanctions when persuasion proves
insufficient, especially since the DT was substantially weakened by the
Codelco decisions.
Recent social science literature has shown that purely self-regulatory
strategies are insufficient to compel employers to comply with the labor
laws.166 State-backed punitive sanctions for insistent, lawbreaking employers
are needed.167 The DT, therefore, was correct to request that the Chilean
legislature allow it standing to sue on behalf of aggrieved workers under the

165. In addition to extending pedagogical inspections to foment self-regulated workplaces,
Chile could also provide labor unions with added institutional support and legal rights to better
represent workers through collective industrial activity and/or judicial actions. However, given
the general weakness of labor unions in Chile, including the under-inclusive character of its
mainly voluntary, enterprise-level unions and the over-representative nature of “negotiating
committees,” what amount in many cases to de facto company unions, the topic of collective
labor law reform deserves its own discussion, separate and apart from the scope of this paper. For
further, general information on Chilean labor unions’ current weaknesses see Diego López
Fernández, La Ineficacia del Derecho a Negociar Colectivamente, in DIRECCIÓN DEL TRABAJO,
NEGOCIACIÓN COLECTIVA EN CHILE: LA DEBILIDAD DE UN DERECHO IMPRESCINDIBLE 43, 53
(2010), available at http://www.dt.gob.cl/documentacion/1612/articles-97510_recurso_1.pdf. (I
thank my colleague Henry H. Perritt, Jr. for raising this point.)
166. See Pires, supra note 1. GAY W. SEIDMAN, BEYOND THE BOYCOTT 29 (2007).
167. For example, in the Dominican Republic, labor inspections have become more effective
as a result of both the extension of pedagogical inspections enhanced by professionalization and
the promise of real sanctions made possible through the recruitment of an incorruptible esprit de
corps to join the inspectorate. Schrank, supra note 1, at 7. In her recent study of effective
enforcement of voluntary codes of conduct through “stateless” strategies organized by consumer
advocacy groups, sociologist Gay Seidman uncovered that even “self regulatory” strategies such
as codes of conduct depended on the threat of trade sanctions by nation–states. SEIDMAN, supra
note 166, at 29. Another recent study in Brazil showed that employers were most likely to comply
with the law in a “sustainable” fashion, meaning that they would not revert to noncompliance,
when the labor inspectorate of the country offered a pedagogical orientation to labor law
infractions while maintaining punitive sanctions in the background as a last resort against
recalcitrant employers. Pires, supra note 1, at 201.
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anti-subcontracting law.168 The request likely was controversial because the
political right-wing has opposed extending the DT’s powers.169 Political
opposition against providing the DT with standing to bring claims under the
anti-subcontracting law, however, could be blunted by packaging that reform
with one that would extend both pedagogical inspections and a model of
voluntary compliance in the country.
V. CONCLUSION: FROM STORM TROOPERS TO LABOR INSPECTORS AND
JUDGES
Enforcing the anti-subcontracting law matters deeply because it goes to the
heart of a history full of broken promises. Chilean working-class history is
riddled with events where workers struggle to defend their rights, only to either
face brutal repression or indifference from the state. As an example, in April
of 1971, more than 1500 workers at the largest textile mill in Chile took over
the mill in response to unaddressed, decades-old workplace grievances,
including wage theft and refusal to recognize their union.170 The workers
seized the mill from the owner after Salvador Allende, the Socialist
Compañero Presidente of the Unidad Popular political coalition, won the
elections and gave the workers confidence to create a new future for
themselves.171 According to historian Peter Winn, the takeover of the large
textile mill symbolically marked the country’s official “road to socialism,” as it
showed workers’ willingness to participate as active members of the political
process.172
Before the textile workers took over the mill, they had depended for
decades on “ill-paid” and “venal” labor inspectors who “turned a blind eye to
[the employer’s] violations of the labor laws and repression of union
democracy. . . .”173 With the triumph of Allende and Unidad Popular in 1970,

168. G. Orellana et al., Justicia da duro golpe a la Dirección del Trabajo y revierte
dictámenes contra Codelco, EL MERCURIO, May 13, 2008 at B2; A. Chaparro & C. Palma, supra
note 149, at 10; H. Cisternas & P. Obregón y L. Castañeda, MINISTROS PÉREZ YOMA Y
ANDRADE REBATEN A CUEVAS Y DICEN QUE CODELCO CUMPLE ACUERDOS, EL MERCURIO, May
14, 2008, at B2.; H. Cisternas & P. Obregón y L. Castañeda La Corte Suprema Dictaría
Precedente: Expertos: fallo apunta a excesos históricos del ente fiscalizador, EL MERCURIO,
May 14, 2008, at B2.
169. For example, in a recent report drafted by an array of experts representing various
political tendencies in Chile, the more conservative voices advocated for limiting the authority of
the DT by splitting the agency into various “specialized” agencies. PATRICIO MELLER, INFORME
FINAL 120–23 (CONSEJO ASESOR PRESIDENCIAL) (2008), http://www.trabajoyequidad.cl/view/
index.asp.
170. PETER WINN, WEAVERS OF REVOLUTION 173, 178 (1986).
171. Id. at 53.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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those textile workers, along with millions of other Chileans, felt that the
government was finally responsive to their material and moral needs.174
Workers not only took to the streets and seized some plants, but also filed
charges with the DT in pursuit of workplace justice.175
Working-class mobilizations at the street, workplace, and bureaucratic
levels suffered a huge setback with the 1973 military coup, which occurred
with the acquiescence, if not direct support, of the United States.176 The
military coup, led by General Augusto Pinochet, quickly dissolved working
class organizations and dismantled state institutions that served workers’
interests. Several years after the coup, the Pinochet dictatorship started an
aggressive neoliberal political project with the aid of the so-called “Chicago
Boys.”177
However, even the military dictatorship could not completely crush
Chilean workers’ resilience and combativeness for a more democratic
society.178 Indeed, miners became the backbone of the organized opposition to
the dictatorship, many times leading heroic labor strikes and other concerted
actions that defied the regime’s brutal repression.179 In 1991, almost twenty
years after the coup, democracy was restored in Chile, but not until after scores
of ordinary workers had been pauperized, harassed, arrested, tortured, and
killed.180 By the 1990s, similar to 1970, Chilean workers expected dramatic
change. Even after significant reconstruction of the DT, change with tangible
results for the working class has been slow to materialize.181 So the miners
continued to strive for labor rights. In 2006, more than 28,000 subcontracted
miners led a massive demonstration in Santiago demanding the same benefits
as regular employees.182 The DT’s subsequent actions against Codelco for
violating the anti-subcontracting law were likely motivated by this national
mobilization of subcontracted miners. However, two years later, the Supreme
Court of Chile stopped the DT’s attempts to compel Codelco, a governmentowned and run institution, to abide by the anti-subcontracting law, making the
statute effectively unenforceable. In this manner, Chile’s labor law is starting

174. Id.
175. Ietswaart, supra note 32.
176. See PETER KORNBLUH, LOS EEUU Y EL DORROCAMIENTO DE ALLENDE: UNA HISTORIA
DESCLASIFICADA (2003).
177. Id.
178. See supra note 20–22.
179. Lance Compa, Laboring for Unity, REPORT ON THE AMERICAS: CHILE 21, 23
(March/April 1988); Thomas Miller Klubock, Class, Community, and Neoliberalism in Chile:
Copper Workers and the Labor Movement During the Military Dictatorship and Restoration of
Democracy, in VICTIMS OF THE CHILEAN MIRACLE 209–10 (Peter Winn ed., 2006).
180. Frank, supra note 17, at 59.
181. See infra notes 148–50.
182. Figueroa Valenzuela, supra note 122, at 132–33.
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become a mere “aspirational” law, such as is the ill-reputed Mexican labor
laws, for example, where the laws “on the books” clash with reality. I cannot
imagine that proudly-legalistic Chile wants to develop such a lackluster
reputation regarding its legal institutions.
Despite the recent developments in Chilean labor law, there are reasons to
be optimistic. First, Chile seems to be part of the general trend in Latin
America to break away from violent resolution of industrial conflict. In the
past, the capitalist class of Chile, as in other Latin American countries, counted
on bayonet-wielding storm troopers to resolve workplace disputes. Today, the
same capitalist class counts on conservative appellate-level courts to protect
their private property rights. While labor advocates may still see these courts
as adversaries, conservative courts are an improvement over state-backed
violence. To paraphrase sociologist Andrew Schrank, Latin American
governments used to resolve “industrial conflict by hiring death squads; today,
they pursue a similar goal by hiring lawyers and labor inspectors.”183
Lawyers—including judges—and inspectors may not be always adequate, but
“their mere existence constitutes progress of a sort and provides a block on
which to build in the rest of the century.”184 Second, the United States, rather
than instigating right-wing coups to crush working-class movements and leftist
governments in Latin America, as it did during the Cold War, can enforce
labor rights through the FTAs.185 In Chile, it can provide technical knowledge
to improve Chilean justice and help Chile enforce its anti-subcontracting law.
It can also legitimately throw its weight behind such an initiative. This is
certainly an improvement over the past. However, laws, norms, and
agreements are never self-executing. We need to put our efforts and energies
into materializing the possibilities that the new national laws and transnational
norms and agreements provide. The path may seem difficult, but there is a
path, nevertheless.

183. Andrew Schrank, Labor Standards in the CAFTA Region: Constructive, Cosmetic, or
Counterproductive?, in OBSERVING GLOBAL TRADE 45 (Miguel Centeno, et al. eds.,) (draft
manuscript) available at http://www.princeton.edu/~cenmiga/works/Observing%20Trade%20
all.pdf#page=129.
184. Id.
185. See supra notes 129–31.
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